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'IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF TKE STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD M. BUTLER 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14750 
SPORTS HAVEN INTERNATIONAL, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a wrongful death action brought by the father 
of a three-year old boy who drowned in a swimming pool on 
July 18, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow, presiding, granted Summary Judgment in 
favor of defendant-respondent and against plaintiff-
appellant.- no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant has failed to clearly and completely 
state the facts relevant to this appeal and a restatement 
of the facts is necessary. The parties will hereinafter 
be designated as they appeared in the trial court. 
On July 18, 1973, the plaintiff's deceased, Gerald M. 
Butler, Jr., drowned in a swimming pool maintained by this 
defendant near Fairview, Utah in Sanpete County. Defendant 
is a non-profit organization that maintains recreational 
facilities and property which are owned by its members. 
Plaintiff became a member of Sports Haven International 
in early 1970 when he purchased a one-acre parcel of the 
5,000 acre Sports Haven property- [Deposition of Gerald 
M. Butler, pages 21, 17]. As members, he and his family 
were free to develop their own property and were entitled 
to use common facilities, including a clubhouse and the 
subject swimming pool, and to participate in recreational 
activities, including horseback riding, snowmobiling and 
boating. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page IS]. Begin-
ning in 1970, he and his family stayed at Sports Haven two 
or three times a month and thereafter continued to make 
frequent trips to the development. [Deposition of Gerald M. 
Butler, pages 18, 23]. 
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On the day of the accident, the plaintiff, his wife, 
their five children and two guests were staying in plain-
tiff's trailer which was parked in an area approximately 
100 yards from the swimming pool, [Plaintiff's Deposition, 
pages 26-27]. July 18th was a Wednesday and there were very 
few other members or guests at the development. [Deposition 
of Gerald M. Butler, page 33J. 
The pool and dressing facilities were completely en-
closed with a chain link fence and were accessible only 
through a gate at the southeast corner. [Deposition of 
Gerald M. Eutler, pages 19, 39; Affidavit of Wendell A. 
Davis]• Plaintiff knew defendant did not provide a lifeguard 
and also knew small children were not to use the pool with-
out supervision. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, pages 19-
20, 27; Affidavit of Wendell A. Davis]. Warning signs were 
posted on the premises advising members that no lifeguard was 
present and that children under the age of 14 were not to use 
the pool without an adult in attendance. [Affidavit of Wendell 
A. Davis]. 
On the afternoon of July 18, 1973, plaintiff's wife 
accompanied their children and guests to the swimming pool 
and watched the smaller ones while they played in the pool. 
[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 24]. Mrs. Butler 
escorted three-year old !fChuckielf and six-year old "Susie" 
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back to the trailer later that afternoon. (.Deposition of 
Gerald M. Butler, page. 27]. The older children remained 
in the pool until Mrs. Butler summoned them to dinner. 
[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 29].. 
At approximately 7:00 p.m., after the family had eaten 
and rested for some period of time, the older girls, ranging 
in age from 10 to 15 years old, decided to return to the 
pool. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, pages 28, 29]. 
Chuckie and his sister Susie wandered off together to play 
on the swings located in a separate area 50-7 5 yards from 
the enclosed pool area. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, 
page 30]. The plaintiff and his wife remained in their 
trailer. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 30]. 
After approximately 15 minutes, Susie returned with-
out her brother who, she reported to her mother, had decided 
to stay at the swings for a while longer. [Deposition of 
Gerald M. Butler, pages 31, 32]. Not long afterwards, the 
older children had gotten out of the pool and retrieved 
their towels from the dressing rooms when Mrs. Butler 
"hollered down to them and asked them if Chuckie was with 
them and they said, fNof.ff [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, 
page 31]. The children returned to the trailer and another 
10 or 15 minutes elapsed before the plaintiff and his wife 
became concerned about the infant. [Deposition of Gerald 
M. Butler, page 33]. 
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Approximately 4 5 minutes after Chuckie had left the 
trailer,, Mr. and Mrs. Butler began searching for him. The 
plaintiff went to the pool area and looked into the water, 
but he stated he could not see the child. [Deposition of 
Gerald M. Butler, pages 34-35]. After looking in other 
areas, Mr. Butler summoned Wendell A. Davis, president of 
Sports Haven International, who was staying in a trailer 
nearby. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 34; Affidavit 
of Wendell A. Davis]. They returned to the swimming pool 
where they discovered the boyfs body. Their efforts to 
resuscitate him failed. 
Plaintiff contends Sports Haven was negligent in fail-
ing to prevent the deceased from gaining access to the 
enclosed pool area. The entire area is fenced, but plain-
tiff asserts the latch on the gate was inoperative. [Depo-
sition of Gerald M. Butler, page 40]. He also contends that 
the water in the swimming pool was so "murky" he could not 
see to the bottom of the pool. Had the water been clearer, 
plaintiff maintains he might have been able to find the boy 
in time to revive him. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, 
page 42] . 
Plaintiff does not know whether his children, or others 
using the pool, left the gate open or closed. [Deposition 
of Gerald M. Butler, page 41]. Whether the three-year old 
infant gained access to the pool area by walking through an 
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open gate or by pushing the unlatched gate open is, and will 
remain, a total mystery. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, 
page 41]. Also, since no one witnessed the infant's fall 
into the pool, plaintiff can only guess how long the deceased 
remained under water before the search began and the plaintiff 
first arrived at the pool site. 
Eased on these facts, defendant sought a Summary Judg-
ment for the reason that plaintiff could not prove the requi-
site causal connection between the negligence complained of 
and the death of the infant. In response to the motion, 
plaintiff could not offer any additional information to show 
that the condition of the latch, rather than the open gate, 
gave the infant access to the pool or that the three-year old 
could have been revived even if found when the plaintiff first 
went to the pool more than 10 minutes after the other children 
returned to the trailer. [Affidavit of Gerald M. Butler]. 
Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant's motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAIN-
TIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE CAUSAL 
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINED 
OF AND TEE DROWNING WITHOUT RESORTING TO 
IMPERMISSIBLE SPECULATION. 
Plaintiff asks the Court to remand this case to the lower 
court for trial because a fact issue exists as to whether this 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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defendant was negligent by failing to repair an alleged 
faulty latch or by failing to provide water clear enough 
to afford visibility of the bottom of the pool. Regardless 
of whether a fact issue as to negligence exists, the Court 
should affirm the ruling of the court below because plain-
tiff cannot prove the requisite nexus between such alleged 
negligence and the drowning. 
The plaintiff's burden in this action and the principle 
followed by the court below in granting Summary Judgment are 
concisely stated in Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. 
566 (1949), as follows: 
It is fundamental that the burden rests upon the 
plaintiff to establish the causal connection be-
tween the injury and the alleged negligence of 
the defendant; that the court may not permit the 
jury to speculate concerning defendants' lia-
bility; and that the court is required to direct 
a verdict unless there is evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably find in favor of the plain-
tiff. 209 P.2d at 568. (Citations omitted). 
As the court below correctly recognized, plaintiff cannot 
meet this burden without resorting to iraperiaissible specula-
tion and his action must fail. 
The condition of the latch securing the gate is in 
dispute, but plaintiff contends it was defective. The con-
dition of the latch is irrelevant, however, since the jury 
cannot be allowed to speculate that the latch, instead of 
the negligence of others in failing to close the gate, 
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provided access to the swimming pool. Either conclusion 
is equally likely. As the plaintiff testified in his depo-
sition: 
Q. Now, in view of the way this thing happened, 
what is it that you claim that the club did 
wrong, or failed to do that it should have 
done? 
A. They should have had the gate taken care of 
properly. I don't know whether the gate 
was closed completely when I went through 
it or not. I was not thinking of that at 
all, I was just thinking of possibly seeing 
him in there. Of course, when I didn't see 
him in there, I was relieved. 
Q. But you don't know whether the girls left 
the pool area, closed the gate or left it 
open or whether anyone else had been there 
in the meantime. 
A. No. 
Q. So the manner in which the gate was opened, 
is just a total mystery, so far as you are 
concerned? 
A. Yes. 
[Deposition of Gerald M. Eutler, page 41]. 
Since the negligence of others in failing to close the 
gate was as likely a cause of the deceased's access to the 
pool as was the condition of the latch, the long-standing 
rule announced in Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Company, 51 
Utah 189, 170 ?. 80 (1917) is dispositive of this portion 
of the plaintiff's claim. In that case, the Court stated: 
-a-
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The rule is well established that where an acci-
dent occurs through the alleged negligence of 
one person which results in injury or damage 
to another, and the injured person seeks to re-
cover damages, and it is made to appear that 
the accident may have been occasioned by one 
of two or several causes, and that the person 
complained of is responsible only for one of 
them, then the burden is on the plaintiff to 
show that the accident and the resulting damages 
were produced by the cause for v/hich the person 
complained of is responsible, and in the case of 
a failure to establish such fact the plaintiff 
must fail in the action. 170 P. at 83, 
The Court then cited with approval from 29 Cyc. 625 where it 
is stated: 
The evidence must, however, do more than merely 
raise a conjecture or show a probability as tc 
the cause of the injury, and no recovery can be 
had if the evidence leaves it to conjecture which 
of two probable causes resulted in the injury, 
where defendant was liable for onlv one of them. 
Id. 
A legion of cases preceded and followed the Tremelling 
decision all of which recognize and resolutely adhere to 
the rule that the plaintiff must prove by more than mere 
conjecture or probability that the acts complained of occur-
red as he alleges. See, e«g«, Reid v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. 
Co^, 39 Utah 617, 118 P. 1009 (1911); Spackman v. Benefit Ass'n 
of Ry. Employees, 97 Utah 91, 89 P.2d 490 (1939); Sumsion v. 
Streator-Smith Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943); Devine 
v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 (1955); In re Richard's 
Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542 (1956). 
-Q-. 
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In this case, the deceased gained access to the pool 
area by reason of one of two equally probable, but mutually 
exclusive, acts of negligence. If the plaintiff's children 
or others using the pool left the gate open, such negligence 
would necessarily be the sole proximate cause of the de-
ceased's ability to enter the pool area. A defective latch 
is no less effective than a functional one when a gate is 
left wide open. Since the plaintiff's young children left 
the pool area just prior to the drowning, the court cannot 
allow the jury to speculate that they closed the gate and, 
but for the defective latch, the infant would not have been 
able to enter the pool area. 
The plaintiff's claim that the "murkiness" of the water 
in the pool proximately caused the death of the infant is 
similarly too speculative to support a recovery against this 
defendant. According to the plaintiff's version of the facts, 
no one was present in the pool area when his infant son en-
tered. As he testified at his deposition: 
Q. So when the girls left the pool to go in 
the clubhouse to get towels and so on, 
there was no one around the pool then to 
observe Chuckie and how he got in to the 
pool? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you never did find out how he got in? 
A. Well, the only v/ay he could have gotten 
in v/as the gate, the gate was open. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. I mean, you didnft find anyone who observed 
him going in? -
A. No. 
[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, pages 33-34]. 
Since no one was present to see the infant fail into 
the water, the plaintiff can only speculate how long the 
child had been in the pool before the first persons arrived 
who could have seen him under any circumstances. No search 
for the deceased began until more than 10 minutes after the 
plaintiff's other children had returned to the trailer. 
[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 42; Affidavit of 
Gerald M. Butler]. Whether the child could have been re-
vived at that time, is, and will remain, an unanswerable 
question. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie 
case by relying upon the alleged condition of the water. In 
order to do so, he must prove that the death would not have 
occurred but for his inability to see through the water to 
the bottom of the pool. To constitute the proximate cause 
of che death, the conduct complained of must be such that 
the accident would not have occurred absent such cause. See 
e.g., Kawaguchi v. Bennett, 112 Utah 442, 189 P.2d 109 
(1948); Coxv. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 (1953). 
The absence of persons who could have seen arid quickly 
rescued the deceased, had visibility not been obscured, 
-11-
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distinguishes Burgert v. Tietjens, 499 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 
1974) from the facts of the instant case. In Burgert/ the 
deceased drowned in a public pool where lifeguards were 
present to supervise swimmers. Since lifeguards were 
present around the pool, the court reasoned that the jury 
would not necessarily have to resort to conjecture to con-
clude that the deceased could have been rescued had a cloudy 
water condition not obscured visibility. In the instant case, 
the jury would necessarily have to speculate that someone 
arrived at the pool before any rescue effort would have been 
futile. 
Plaintiff has not asserted any claim before this Court 
that defendant's failure to provide lifeguards or attendants 
could constitute negligence in this case. His concession of 
this issue is clearly correct. Owners of private facilities, 
as in this case, are held to a less stringent standard of 
care than proprietors of public facilities. See e.g., 
Cale v. Johnson, 177 Kan. 576, 280 P-2d 538 (1955); Tulsa 
Exposition and Fair Corp. v. Jayner, 257 P.2d 1077 (Okla. 
1953); 85 C.J.S. Theaters and Shows §41. Nevertheless, even 
proprietors of public swimming pools are not required to 
provide lifequards or attendants to comply with safety 
recommendations promulgated by the Utah State Division of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Health. Recognizing that swimming pools are often neces-
sarily made available for use during most hours of the day, 
even though few people, if any, may actually use the facility 
at any given time, the State concedes that requiring an 
attendant to be present at all times would clearly be unrea-
sonable. Accordingly, even operators of public pools may 
elect the following alternative to providing lifeguards: 
Where no lifeguard service is provided, a warn-
ing sign shall be placed in plain view and shall 
state "Warning-no lifeguard on duty" with clearly 
legible letters, at least four inches high. In 
addition, the sign shall also state "Children 
should not use pool without an adult in atten-
dance." Utah State Division of Health Recom-
mended Code of Regulations on the Design, Con-
struction and Operating of Public Swimming Pools, 
§87 (adopted July 21, 1965). 
Even though this defendant is not required to comply 
with such safety recommendations, it did so. Since the time 
the pool was open in 1372 and at the time of this incident, 
a warning sign was located on the fence surrounding the pool 
which warned that no lifequard was on duty and that children 
under 14 should not use the pool without an adult in atten-
dance. [Affidavit of Wendell A. Davis]. 
The fact that an unfortunate accident occurred upon 
this defendant's property does not, of course, establish 
that it is liable. Eaton v. Savage, 28 Utah 2d 353, 502 
-13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
P.2d 564 (1972); Pollick v. J, C. Penney Co., 24 Utah 2d 405, 
473 P.2d 394 (1970). As the court below correctly held, 
plaintiff has failed to offer the requisite proof that the 
conduct complained of proximately caused the child's death. 
Allegations that the condition.of the latch and the water 
in the pool caused this accident are necessarily dependent 
upon surmise, conjecture, guess and speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
No witness has been found who knows exactly how or when 
the infant entered the pool enclosure and how, when and under 
what circumstances he fell into the pool. The plaintiff's 
allegation that a faulty latch gave the infant access to the 
pool ignores an equally likely explanation that his children, 
or others using the pool immediately prior to the death, left 
the gate wide open. The Court cannot allow a jury to guess 
which act of negligence actually was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. Similarly, since no one was present in the 
pool area when the infant drowned, a jury cannot conclude 
that the condition of the water frustrated rescue efforts 
that might have saved him. 
Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot prove a prima 
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facie case and the Court should therefore affirm the judgment 
of the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ^cP^SbCL I J o ^ — — 
E l l i o t t J/. Williams 
Attorneyjfor Defendant-
Respondent 
s 
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